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be neither well versed in law nor skilled in interpreting, deciding, and resolving legal questions.3 81 Another disadvantage arises from the fact that an industrial accident board, being an administrative agency, is not bound by the
rules of evidence and procedure applicable to the courtsY8 9 Since all forms
of evidence, including ex parte affidavits and other hearsay, are admissible
before administrative boards,3 90 it is possible that the substantial evidence
rule could lead to the establishment of inappropriate precedents. This could
arise, for example, if a court upheld a board decision on the basis that there
was sufficient evidence supporting such decision, even though undisclosed
portions of the evidence relied on by the board were incompetent.
There were 2,394 notices of intention to appeal filed with the Texas Industrial Accident Board in 1973,3 91 of which it can be reasonably assumed that
many were settled or dropped before the trial date. Based on these statistics,
it does not appear that the Texas courts have been burdened with an excessive number of workmen's compensation cases. Furthermore, in 1973,
there were 641 cases in which the courts awarded different dollar amounts
of compensation than that given by the Board. 392 In those cases, the board
had awarded a total of $6,940,834.00, while the courts had awarded only
$3,289,081.00.393 Thus, the theory that the administrative agency Will enforce the Act with only a minimal difference than would the courts if they
heard the cases de novo appears to be without merit.

AREAS OF CHANGING INTERPRETATION:
HEART AND NEUROSIS CASES
Two areas in the field of workmen's compensation which have seen evolution through significant judicial decisions are those involving claims predicated upon heart attacks and neurosis. In these areas the nature of the cases
presented for judicial review has required that the courts fashion judicial doctrine so as to enable deserving claimants to recover for disabilities not specifically controlled by terms of the statute. At the same time, however, -the
courts must keep liability for heart and neurosis claims within ordained
bounds, particularly where the injuries are idiopathic. Heart and neurosis
cases turn predominantly on the factual situations and on medical testimony
388. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 2 (1967) requires only one member
of the Board to be an attorney.
389. See Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Huntsman, 125 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Fort Worth 1939, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mote, 116 S.W.2d
427, 430-31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938, writ dism'd by agr.).
390. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lincecum, 126 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1939, no writ); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jimenez, 267 S.W. 752, 755
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, writ dism'd).
391. ANN. REP. OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BD. 2 (1973).
,392. Id. at 6.

393. Id. at 6.
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tending to show the probability of causal relation between employment activity and the injury sustained.
GENERAL SCOPE OF HEART CASES

In heart attack cases the traditional requisite for a successful compensation
Claim is the showing of unusual strain or overexertion by the employee in
the course of his employment.5 94 The claimant must show that the heart injury sustained occurred immediately after strenuous physical activity which
would not have been undertaken by the employee in the ordinary performance of his dutiesA 95 This rule has resulted in a panorama of decisions awarding or denying recovery on the basis of the type of employment and the activity involved. From these varied decisions the question naturally arises as to
what an unusual exertion in an occupation is, since the quantum of exertion
in a job may vary from day to day and from business to business. The principle has been criticized at length by Professor Larson for its orientation toward
accidental cause rather than result, and its impracticality in application.396
Despite its limitations, the unusual exertion requirement survives in some 12
397
jurisdictions.
As pointed out by Professor Larson, the concept of unusual exertion as
a requisite for recovery stems from statutory requirements that an injury be
"accidental" in order to be compensable 9 s Even where not statutorily imposed, the "accidental" requirement has been judicially adopted in all but
six states.399 Under this requirement, "unusual" or "unexpected" is equated
with "accidental" for the purposes of determining the character of the injury.
Thus in the situation where the employee is stricken with a heart attack while
394. Friendly Frost Used Appliances v. Reiser, 152 So. 2d 721, 723 (Fla. 1963);

Herbert v. Sharp Bros. Contracting Co., 467 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971);
Rose v. City of Fairmont, 300 N.W. 574, 577 (Neb. 1941); Hrynkin v. Davis & Lyon,
265 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (App. Div. 1965), af'd, 234 N.E.2d 453 (1967); York v. State
Workmen's Ins. Fund, 200 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1938).
395. Marlowe v. Huron Mountain Club, 260 N.W. 130, 132 (Mich..1935).
396. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 38.61-38.63 (1973);
Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Suggested
Solution, 65 MICH. L. REv. 441, 465-68 (1967); see, e.g., Philadelphia Dairy Prods. Co.
v. Farran, 57 A.2d 88 (Del. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 61 A.2d 400 (Del. 1948) (salesman injured in unusual exertion of carrying 15 pound parcel was compensated); Marlowe v.
Huron Mountain Club, 260 N.W. 130 (Mich. 1935) (postal employee injured in routine
lifting of 200 pound sacks of mail was denied compensation).
397. Colorado, Delware, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington. Larson, The "Heart Cases"
in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Suggested Solution, 65 MICH L. REV.

441, 445, 447 n.18 (1967).
398. Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV.441, 442-44 (1967), citing Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4123.01(c) (1973).
399. Id. at 442. The six states are California, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Rhode Island, and Texas.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol6/iss3/8

2

Endres: Areas of Changing Interpretation: Heart and Neurosis Cases Studen

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:608

he is engaged merely in his usual ordinary routine type of work, compensation
is denied on the ground that the heart injury sustained did not constitute an
"accident" within the legal definition of "compensable injury. '' 400
In the course of workmen's compensation litigation, the majority of jurisdictions have liberalized their construction of the term "accidental injury,"
extending it to apply in situations where the work done is usual and ordinary,
but either the cause or the result is unexpected. 401 This criterion is applied
regardless of the pre-existing health of the employee, subject only to the qualifying proviso that the exertion be "either the sole or a contributing cause
of the injury. ' 40 2 Since medical evidence in heart attack cases usually establishes the fact that the victim had a pre-existing heart disease which rendered
him susceptible to an attack, the above limitation becomes extremely significant. There must be established a causal connection between the work activity and the heart injury. The claimant must prove that the exertion within
the scope of employment produced or aggravated the disease which was the
cause of the disability. 40 3 As defined by the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
[t]he legal criterion in compensation cases involving heart disease
should be whether the accident [exertion] caused a change in the employee's physical condition which is disabling, and not whether the accident changed the diseased organ of the employee. The residual condition from an accidental injury which substantially increases the possibility of recurrence of a disabling or death-dealing episode is legally disabling and is compensable .... 404
In cases where the heart attack is aggravated or precipitated by mental
or emotional stress arising out of the employee's work, the majority of jurisdictions have seen fit to award compensation on the basis of criteria maintaining varying degrees of strictness. 40 5 Consequently, the success of claims
involving emotionally induced heart attacks varies accordingly. Most decisions, controlled by the legislative "injury by accident" provision, have adhered to the "unusualness" requirement in these cases. 40 6 Since it is diffi400. Russell v. Southwest Grease & Oil Co., 509 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974).
401. E.g., Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 296 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Ark. 1956):
Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So. 2d 867, 869 (La. 1973); Sheppard v. Michigan Nat'I
Bank, 83 N.W.2d 614, 626 (Mich. 1957).
402. Bryant Stave & Heading Co. v. White, 296 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Ark. 1956).
403. Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 221 So. 2d 816, 827 (La. 1968); Dwyer
v. Ford Motor Co., 178 A.2d 161, 164 (N.J. 1962); Flint Constr. Co. v. Dowmun, 444
P.2d 200, 203 (Okla. 1968).
404. Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 221 So. 2d 816, 828 (La. 1968) (court's
emphasis).
405. Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom.,
Royal Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 302 U.S. 736 (1937); Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So.
2d 867 (La. 1973); Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961);
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Calhoun, 426 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
406. Korsun's Case, 235 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Mass. 1968) (employee suffered heart at-
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cult for the claimant to satisfy this requirement in situations where the heart
attack was produced by emotional pressures, the number of denials of compensation in nonphysical exertion cases are proportionately higher than in
physical exertion cases. 40 7 A few jurisdictions, however, have utilized the
sound causal connection principle as applied in physically induced heart
cases. 408 Considering the elusiveness of the problem in mentally induced injuries, this progression away from the "unusualness" requirement is quite a
significant development.
An early decision, Hoage v. Royal Indemnity Co.,40 9 applied the theory
of cause and effect to the sequence of facts in order to bring the case of an
emotionally induced heart attack within the purview of the statutory requisite
of "accidental injury." The plaintiff was a claims adjuster who, after working
feverishly for 8 months under the pressures of an increasing number of cases,
collapsed at his desk from angina pectoris. 410 A cardiac specialist testified
that plaintiff's overwork, worry, and emotional strain produced a spasm in
a coronary artery and brought about the collapse. From this evidence the
court concluded that the attack was the consequence of continued overwork
and mental strain required of the plaintiff by his employer, and deemed the
'411
angina pectoris and resultant disability "accidental."
In Klimas v. Trans CaribbeanAirways,4 12 the New York Court of Appeals
reviewed that state's judicial policy, which was in the process of evolving in
favor of compensating physical injuries resulting from nonphysical strain, and
reached the conclusion that the decedent's emotionally induced heart attack
was an "industrial accident. ' 413 Deceased was director of maintenance and
engineering for the airline. One of the planes under his supervision was
grounded because of a defect, and decedent was personally harangued by his
employer for negligence and incompetence. Under pressure to have the
tack from emotional stress induced by sight of empty whiskey bottle placed on his desk
and fear that he would lose his job); Goodwin v. State Workmen's Compensation Bd.,
249 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (App. Div.), aII'd, 254 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1964) (referee for state
workmen's compensation board, with prior history of ulcers and hypertension, suffered
paralyzing stroke, attributed to situation of emotional tension with claimant in addition
to exceptional workload of hearings with its attendant emotional stress.
407. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 38.65 (1973).
408. Lamb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 113 Cal. Rptr. 162, 168
(1974); Insurance Dept. v. Dinsmore, 102 So. 2d 691, 694 (Miss Ct. App.), a! 'd on
rehearing, 104 So. 2d 296 (Miss. 1958).
409. 90 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 736 (1937).
410. Angina pectoris is the medical term applied to symptoms of sudden, short
paroxysms of chest pain, usually precipitated by exertion and arising from temporary
insufficiency of coronary circulation. E. SAGALL & B. REED, THE HEART AND THE LAW
498 (1968).
411. Hoage v. Royal Indem. Co., 90 F.2d 387, 391 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Royal Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 302 U.S. 736 (1937).
412. 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
413. Id. at 19.
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plane repaired, decedent first had difficulty procuring replacement parts;
then, handed a staggering repair bill for which he felt personally responsible,
he spent some extremely frustrating hours in an attempt to reduce the
amount. In a state of depression and agitation, Klimas, who had no prior
history of heart disease, suffered a fatal myocardial infarction. 414 To the majority of the reviewing court this case contained no barrier to sustaining the
award of the Board, in view of precedent decisions allowing compensation
where physical injuries were incurred as a result of fright, nervous shock, continued anxiety, severe pressure and excessive strain from employment. 415 On
the other hand, the minority could not justify stretching compensability to
cover an idiopathic injury which was "essentially the result of the customary
stress and strain of life."' 41 6 While the dissent had looked for an "industrial
accident" in a "real, objective sense,"' 417 -the majority opinion turned on the
fact that, at the time of the fatal attack, the employee was embroiled in a
state of prolonged emotional tension arising directly out of the pressures and
problems of his employment. 4 18 It was sufficient that his death was shown
to have been caused by the protracted emotional stress of his employment;
that decedent may have been unusually vulnerable to mental stress was not
41 9
considered to have been the issue.
The lenient principle of Klimas found fuller expression in the recent California case of Lamb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,420 in which
the Supreme Court of California reversed the Board's denial of award on conclusion that the Board had failed to consider evidence tending to show that
emotional stress was a contributing cause of the decedent's heart attack.421
As stipulated by the court,
it is not the Board's assessment of 'the amount of stress inherent in a
414. Myocardial infarction refers to the destruction of heart muscle tissue resulting
from an insufficiency of blood supply to the heart wall. E. SAGALL & B. REED, THE
HEART AND THE LAw 449 (1968).
415. Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16-18 (1961), citing
Pickerell v. Schumacher, 152 N.E.2d 434 ('N.Y. 1926) (fright when emergency brake
failed to hold as motor vehicle rolled backwards); Krawczyk v. Jefferson Hotel, 103
N.Y.S.2d 40 (App. Div. 1951) (shock from witnessing fight between two other employees); Furtado v. American Export Airlines, 83 N.Y.S.2d 745 (App. Div. 1948) (continued overwork in supervising of construction); Church v. Westchester County, I
N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1938) (mental stress on being vigorously cross-examined during employer's trial).
416. Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 219 N.Y.S.2d 14, 20 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
417. Id. at 20.
418. Id. at 18.
419. Cf. Cramer v. Barney's Clothing Store, 223 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div.
1962), a! 'd, 241 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1963), in which claimant suffered a myocardial infarction while involved in an argument with his supervisor over his paycheck. Recovery
was denied on the ground of lack of "aggravated and prolonged situation of emotional
tension" as existed in Klimas. Id. at 814.
420. 113 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974).
421. Id. at 168.
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workmen's employment which governs in matters of stress-caused injury,
but rather the Board's determination of the amount of stress which the
particular
employment has in fact exerted upon the particular work2
man. 42
Essential to a finding that emotional stress of employment has contributed
to an injury is the rule that a pre-existing heart disease does not bar compensation for an injury arising out of employment which accelerates the heart
disease to the point of disability. 4 23 Thus, whether the employee's condition
was average or pre-existing subnormal makes no difference as long as 'the
424
disability was proximately caused by an injury arising out of employment.
The apparent trend in heart cases is to consider the individual employee
and his particular situation in order to determine if some job-related event
or events was a producing or contributing cause of the injury. Under this
principle, any distinction between the physical and emotional stimuli provoking a heart attack is without foundation. The logic of the rule applies equally
to both types of situations in determining whether the injury was an accidental one:
[i]t seems unthinkable that, if hypertension may be aggravated either
by physical or mental and emotional exertion, courts should be willing
-toaccept the physical as causative, but reject, as not accidental, a disability, proximately resulting from mental and emotional exertion. 425
An illustrative example is Ferguson v. HDE, Inc.,42 6 a Louisiana case in
which the claimant became upset and angry over a paycheck that was substantially lower than he had expected, and, in the midst of a heated discourse
with his superior, suffered a stroke resulting in paralysis. The lower courts
had denied compensation on the basis of precedent that emotionally caused
disabilities were not compensable under the Louisiana statute requiring that
the injury be "by accident. ' 427 In overruling its earlier decision and awarding compensation, the supreme court applied the statutory definition of "accident" to the facts and concluded that the injury was accidental because it
was "unexpected and unforeseen," it "happened suddenly and violently," and
it produced "objective symptoms of injury. '428 The court reasoned 'that since
the event. producing the injury was clearly job-connected, 'the claim should
not be rejected merely because the exertion resulting in disability was emo4 29
tional rather than physical.
422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at 168 (court's emphasis).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 167 n.6.
Insurance Dept. v. Dinsmore, 102 So. 2d 691, 694 (Miss. Ct. App.), aff'd on

rehearing, 104 So. 2d 296 (Miss. 1958).
426. 270 So. 2d 867 (La. 1973), rev'g 254 So. 2d 691 (La. Ct. App. 1971).

427. Danziger v. Employers Mut. Liab. Co., 156 So. 2d 468 (La. 1963).
428. Ferguson v. I-IDE, Inc., 270 So. 2d 867, 869 (La. 1973), rev'g 254 So. 2d 691
(La. Ct. App. 1971).
429. Id. at 870.
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This extreme liability, as manifested by the Louisiana court, is easily susceptible to criticism on the ground that the award was apparently unjustified.
Cases like Ferguson seem to herald runaway compensability and transform
workmen's compensation into a system of health insurance coverage for any
heart attack. But the critic must bear in mind the legal principle underlying
all workmen's compensation litigation and its logical application to the facts:
compensation as provided by the statute should be awarded when the evidence shows that some factor of employment significantly contributed to the
injury, regardless of whether the precipitating stimulus was of physical or
emotional nature. The range of compensability should be limited, not by the
nonphysical nature of the precipitating cause, but rather by the indefinite nature of the cause. Recovery will and should be denied if the cause of the
injury, whether physical or emotional, lacks a sufficiently definite connection
to the job. This view is illustrated by the Texas cases, which have generally
required the showing of a definite or specific cause arising out of employment
as requisite to awarding compensation for emotionally induced heart attacks.
HEART CASES IN TEXAS

Litigation of heart attack cases under Texas workmen's compensation law
has established that unusual exertion is not a requisite for an award; 430 a
gradual buildup of emotional stress as43the sole producing cause of a heart
attack, however, will preclude recovery. '
Texas is one of six states which has neither legislatively nor judicially
adopted the requirement that a compensable injury be accidental in character. 43 2 The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act defines personal injury
simply as "damage or harm to the physical structure of the body and such
other diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom. '433 In response the
courts have formulated the basic guiding principle:
[t]o recover under the Act it need only be shown that an injury to the
physical structure of the body was sustained by the employee as a result
while the employee was acting
of a risk or hazard of the employment
43 4
in the course of his employment.
A risk can be incidental to usual work activity; therefore, an injury will be
430. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
431. See Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Sup.
1972).
432. Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and Sug-

gested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 442 (1967). The other five states are California,
Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Rhode Island.
433. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1974).

434. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 488 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.
2d 779, 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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deemed compensable, in the absence of unusual strain or overexertion, if a
causal connection is established between the injury and the employee's work
43 5
performance.
To prove this causal connection the heart disability must be traceable to
a definite time, place, and event. 436 This judicially imposed requirement
arises from cognizance that the legislature did not intend to provide general
health insurance by enacting workmen's compensation law. 43 7 As the factual
situation in most heart cases includes a pre-existing heart disease which
creates vulnerability to an attack, the rule may be applied in these cases more
strictly through a closer scrutiny of the evidence to ascertain causal connection. Two Texas cases illustrating successful claims under application of the
causal connection rule are Insurance Co. of North America v. Kneten 43 8 and
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Calhoun.43 9 In Kneten the supreme court
concluded that the heart attack, promptly following an electrical shock received while claimant was drilling, could reasonably have been precipitated
by the work incident, notwithstanding the fact that claimant had arteriosclerosis which predisposed him to an attack. 440 In Calhoun a millwright died
of coronary occlusion 15 days after he had taken a nerve-racking overhead
welding test. His symptoms of heart damage had begun immediately after
he took the 'test and had continued until his death. It was determined that
the "progressive disease process" had been produced specifically by the welding test and aggravated by continued physical activity of decedent's employ441
ment.
On the other hand, recovery was denied in Olson v. Hartford Accident
& Indemnity Co.,442 where the claimant sought compensation for disability
resulting from a heart attack precipitated by four emotionally stressful incidents arising out of his employment. The majority was of the opinion that
435. Carter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 132 Tex. 288, 120 S.W.2d 581 (1938) (maid in
hotel suffered hemorrhage from lifting and carrying heavy loads and moving furniture);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Herzik, 359 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (oven loader in bakery sustained coronary occlusion in usual
course of work); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gant, 346 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1961, no writ) (grocery truck driver suffered heart attack while delivering
53 pound packages); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (employee in dry cleaning store suffered stroke after frightening
berating by customer).
436. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Sup.
1972); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
437. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Sup.
1972).
438. 440 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
439. 426 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
440. Insurance Co. of North America v. Kneten, 440 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. Sup. 1969).
441. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Calhoun, 426 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
442. 477 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Sup. 1972) (Steakley and Reavley, JJ., dissenting).
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the requirement of a definite time, place and cause was not met; that
,the claimant had not related his injury to any precipitating strain, traumatic
shock, or particular mental stimulus. 443 A strong dissent argued that the
cumulative effect of emotional stresses arising out of job-related incidents and
resulting in heart attack is comparable, as a precipitating cause, to any physical strain which produces the same result.444 The dissent would not have
drawn a distinction either between physical and mental stimuli or between
one fortuitous event and a gradual buildup of stressful incidents, as precipitating causes of injury. The controlling principle, according to the dissent,
would have been whether or not the claimant had met his burden of establishing a probable causal relationship between the job-related stress and the
injury. 445 The minority believed that there was probative evidence of jobconnected incidents, shown by medical testimony to have contributed to and
44 6
precipitated the coronary occlusion.
Olson has definitively established Texas' position of reluctance with regard
to emotionally induced heart attacks. Texas limits liability in heart cases
by imposing specificity or particularity of stimulus as the predicate of the
claim. This requisite has the effect both of broadening and of limiting situations of recovery: it broadens compensability to include situations where,
in the absence of unusual stress or strain, there is simply a particular event
or activity which produces the injury; it excludes from recovery situations in
which the heart attack cannot reasonably be traced to a specific event or activity of employment. Thus, under the Texas requirement it can hardly be
asserted that workmen's compensation provides general health insurance for
heart attack victims.
GENERAL SCOPE OF NEuRosIs CASES

Judicial interpretation of the law in workmen's compensation claims based
on neurotic disabilities is in a state of gradual development. Initially the
courts were constrained to grant recovery for such a nebulous claim as a mental injury; care and precaution were exercised in view of the possibility of
feigned and exaggerated mental afflictions. 447 With advances in medical science and dependable diagnosis, however, skepticism has generally given way
to recognition of genuine mental or nervous injuries arising in the course of
employment. 448
443. Id. at 860.
444. Id. at 862.
445. Id. at 862.
446. Id. at 862.
447. See, e.g., Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511, 518 (La.
Ct. App. 1958); Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 537, 209 S.W.2d 345, 354
(1948) (dissenting opinion). See also Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 4 N.W.2d 741, 743
(Neb. 1942).
448. Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 627, 633 (Ariz. 1960); Baker v. Work-
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In situations where the mental injury or neuroses is related to a physical
injury or trauma or to a particular event, compensation for the mental disability is now almost universally allowed. 449 In these decisions the requisite
to establishing a "real" injury is the physical component. 450 The heart cases
discussed above are good examples of the common situations in which a physical disability is directly precipitated by nervous stress, shock, or some untoward or frightening event. 451 The obvious physical injury resulting from
mental or emotional stimuli constitutes evidence tending to establish a causal
relation between the incident arising out of employment and the disability,
and the injury is therefore deemed "accidental" within the meaning of workmen's compensation laws. Conversely, when the employee suffers a physical
injury and then develops a resultant neurosis, the causal connection may likewise be established by medical testimony to that effect. 452 In such instances
where mental disability succeeds or is precipitated by physical injury or
trauma, it is termed "traumatic neurosis" or "conversion reaction. ' 455
An early decision awarding compensation when the neurosis was traceable
to a physical traumatic event was Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co. 454 in which
the claimant had recovered for physical disabilities resulting from an injury
to his head while working in a mine. He subsequently filed for modification
of the award due to changed conditions, complaining of severe headaches,
insomnia, and inability to return to work. Medical witnesses were of the
opinion that his condition was not due to any organic injury, but was a traumatic neurosis traceable to his accident and injury. One doctor referred to
claimant's fear of going underground again, submitting that the recurrence
of headaches when he attempted to work underground was 'the result of nervmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 283 (Ct. App. 1971); Peterson v.
Department of Labor & Indus., 33 P.2d 650, 651 (Wash. 1934).
449. See generally I A. LARSON, THE 'LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 42.2242.23 (1973).
450. Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 627, 633 (Ariz. 1960) (fall resulting
in injury to back produced hysteria disability); Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 109 P.2d
622, 624 (Idaho 1941) (traumatic psychosis developed after injury sustained in mine);
Muse v. Sentry Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 609, 614 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (traumatic neurosis
traceable to vicious beating at hands of fellow worker). But see Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 49 P.2d 391, 392 (Ariz. 1935) (neurosis not induced by pulmonary injury which resulted from accident at plant).
451. See, e.g., Lamb v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 520 P.2d 978 (Cal.
1974); Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So. 2d 867 (La. 1973); Klimas v. Trans Caribbean
Airways, Inc., 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
452. See for example, Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 627 (Ariz. 1960);
Skelly v. Sunshine Mining Co., 109 P.2d 622 (Idaho 1941); Muse v. Sentry Ins. Co.,
269 So. 2d 609 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522,
209 S.W.2d 345 (1948); Colonial Penn Franklin Ins. Co. v. Mayfield, 508 S.W.2d 449
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Clayton v. Employers Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); Peterson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 33 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1934).
453. 3 R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 104.02(4) (3d ed. 1973).
454. 109 P.2d 622 (Idaho 1941).
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ous stimulation rather than a brain injury. The court then determined that
Skelly's changed condition amounted to traumatic neurosis which was produced by his accidental injury; compensation for the increased disability was
granted notwithstanding evidence that the neurosis was aggravated or accentuated by financial worries and marital troubles. 455
A traumatic psychoneurosis of a somewhat different nature presented a
Louisiana appellate court with the issue of whether an alleged disability was
real or imaginary. 4" 6 In Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,4"
the employee's condition was diagnosed as "conversion hysteria," in which
the loss of emotional control leads to derangement in the nervous system and
resultant perversions of motor and sensory functions. 45 The claim was predicated upon an injury to the leg, resulting in a neurotic reaction exhibited
by a grotesque limp, increased pain, and fatigability. The insurance company contended that the neurological and psychiatric testimony presented no
objective evidence of disability, and that plaintiff's case depended solely upon
subjective evidence. Under the law requiring traceability of neurosis to an
accidental injury, however, a party may establish by subjective evidence the
existence of a present disability if it is related to an originally physical condition. 45 9 Once the physical injury was established, the court's task was to
determine the sufficiency of the subjective evidence. The court rejected the
supposition that the claimant was a "malingerer" and concluded instead, from
the positive testimony of a neurologist, that he was disabled from a genuine
neurosis. 460 In view of the fact that a person so disabled may honestly simulate instantaneous physical changes upon suggestion, the court simply acknowledged the paradox that a disability is nonetheless real even though its
causation is imaginary. 461 Had there not been a precedent physical injury,
however, it is questionable that the court would have been willing to give
the claimant the benefit of the doubt.
Additionally, the insurance company had intimated that Miller was suffering from "compensationitis. ' '46 2 Such condition has also been referred to as
"desire neurosis '463 and "unconscious desire for compensation. '464 According
to Professor Larson, there is a hazy line between this "compensation neurosis"
455. Id. at 627.
456. Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511, 515 (La. Ct. App.
1958).
457. Id. at 511.
458. 3 R. GRAY,ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 104.52(1) (3d ed. 1973).
459. Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511, 515, 517 (La. Ct.
App. 1958).
460. Id. at 516-17.
461. Id. at 520.
462. Id. at 519. The insurance company argued that the efficient cure of claimant's
condition would be application of a "greenback poultice."
463. Peterson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 33 P.2d 650, 652 (Wash. 1934).
464. Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 526, 209 S.W.2d 345, 347 (1948).
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and malingering; the former, an unconscious desire for compensation, is
usually compensable while the latter, a conscious desire, is not. 4" 5 As stated
in Miller, however, "courts will stigmatize a claimant as a malingerer only
upon positive and convincing evidence justifying such a conclusion. 4 6
Compensation neurosis is a genuine disability which may arise out of the
strain of protracted litigation of a workmen's compensation claim, or an unconscious desire to prolong compensation payments. 467 It is a mental reaction to the claimant's present objective situation.
The Supreme Court of Texas followed this rationale in Hood v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. 468 In this case, claimant sustained an injury to his
foot, and medical testimony showed that he developed a disabling neurosis,
characterized by pain and shifting anesthetic zones in the foot, as a result
of the injury. A medical expert opined that the neurosis was "in part influenced by an unconscious desire for compensation, and after termination
of this litigation he will begin to improve. ' 469 The court found that the neurotic disability resulted from a physical injury and that was a sufficient fact
on which to award compensation. 470 In response to the allegation of "unconscious desire for compensation," the court further declared that even if
this were a contributing cause of the disability, it would not defeat an award
because the unconscious desire would be merely incidental to the traumatic
neurosis which was the producing cause of the injury. 471
There is a lack of agreement among jurisdictions on the issue of awarding
compensation in neurosis cases where there is absence of physical trauma,
that is, where a mental disability is produced solely by mental stimuli. 47 2
New York case law has steadfastly held that a mental injury precipitated
solely by a mental cause is not an accidental injury and is not compensable. 473
In states whose statutes require violence to the physical structure of -the body,
465. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.24 (1973).
466. Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 99 So. 2d 511, 516 (La. Ct. App.
1958).
467. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.24 (1973).
468. 146 Tex. 522, 526, 209 S.W.2d 345, 347 (1948).
469. id. at 526, 209 S.W.2d at 347.
470. Id. at 528, 209 S.W.2d at 348.
471. Id. at 526, 209 S.W.2d at 347-48; accord, Peterson v. Department of Labor &
Indus., 33 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1934).
472. Awarding compensation: Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96
Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (Ct. App. 1971); Carter v. General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105,
113 (Mich. 1960). Denying compensation: MacKenzie v. General Motors Corp., 210
N.W.2d 357, 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 354
N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (App. Div. 1974). See generally 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 42.23 (1973).
473. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 354 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (App. Div. 1974)
(claimant was first to discover body of supervisor who had killed himself at office, suffered acute depressive reaction and given shock treatments; compensation denied); accord, Straws v. Fail, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (App. Div. 1962); Chernin v. Progress Serv.
Co., 192 N.YS.2d 758, 760 (App. Div. 1959), aff'd, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1961).
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an emotionally induced mental disorder is not compensable. 474 In cases
awarding compensation, the primary requirement is that of establishing a
causal connection between the employment and the mental disability, regardless of whether the incident arising out of employment is emotional pres476
sure 475 or an unexpected event.
California subscribes to the view that a physical accident or trauma is not
a prerequisite for recovery for psychoneurotic injury. 477 The rule prevails
that a psychoneurotic injury "caused by the work environment" is compensable. 478 Thus the claimant need produce evidence tending to show only that
his psychoneurotic injury was sustained in the course of his employment. 479
In Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,48 0 plaintiff was a fireman whose exposure to smoke and fumes in fighting a rubber fire, combined
with his knowledge that many of his co-workers were afflicted 'with heart disease, caused him to develop "cardiac neurosis." Medical experts testified
'that plaintiff in fact had no cardiovascular disease; his symptoms were emotionally induced and attributable to his employment. The court determined
that the only reasonable inference from this evidence was that plaintiff was
disabled from a psychoneurotic injury of industrial causation. 48 ' California
law recognizes that a disabling physical injury "may be 'the result of the cumulative effect of each day's stress and strains. '482 Consequently, there is
no logical basis for a different requirement as to a psychoneurotic injury
which is just as real and disabling as a physical injury.
A classic case before the Supreme Court of Michigan presented the issue
of compensability of psychoneurotic disability resulting from emotional pressures of employment. Carter v. General Motors Corp.483 involved a claimant
who suffered paranoid schizophrenic psychosis as a result of the daily pressures of his assembly line employment. Carter's physician explained that
Carter had a personality predisposition towards development of paranoid
schizophrenic collapse, and that the assembly line job with its attendant demands was the precipitating factor. The Board's finding of casual connection
474. Bekeleski v. O.F. Neal Co., 4 N.W.2d 741, 743 (Neb. 1942) (elevator operator
denied compensation for shock occasioned by seeing passenger killed). But see Peavy
v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co., 40 So. 2d 505 (La. Ct. App. 1949) (compensation
awarded for nervous disorder arising out of accident from which no demonstrable physical pathology resulted).
475. Carter v. General Motors Corp., 106 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Mich. 1960).
476. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
477. Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 96 Cal. Rptr. 279, 285 (Ct.
App. 1971).
478. Id. at 285.
479. Id. at 285.
480. Id. at 279.
481. Id. at 285-86.
482. Id. at 286.
483. 106 N.W.2d 105 (Mich. 1960).
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was properly based on this expert opinion; the question for the court was
whether Carter's mental disability was to be treated differently from a physical injury caused by employment. 48 4 The court surveyed its prior decisions
granting recovery for mentally induced neurotic disorders on the ground that
such injuries were "accidents" within -the meaning of workmen's compensation law, and noted -that aggravation of a pre-existing latent mental disturbance does not bar recovery. 485 Finally, the court determined that the statute does not exclude injuries which are not attributable to a single event. 48 6
The significant result is that under a liberal judicial construction and application of the statute, compensation of a peculiar psychoneurotic injury was
awarded.
In discarding the requirement of traceability to a single event, Carter essentially did away with any exclusion of compensation for psychoneurotic disabilities. Thus the projected effect is that the industrial employer will become an insurer for mental breakdowns of his employees who cannot withstand further dehumanizing, depressing or emotionally pressured work.
Possibly industry and the consuming public should be the ones to bear the
cost of psychological trauma resulting to employees whose work efforts on
the assembly line have produced the innumerable items of convenience upon
which society has come to depend. While ,this issue is legislative in nature,
nonetheless the courts must determine the compensability of neurotic disabilities resulting from cumulative emotional stress. As in a graduated heart
case, the requisite of a particular precipitating cause arising out of employment ought to be applied in the case of a gradual mental breakdown. The
requirement that the mental disability be traceable to a specific stimulus related to employment should prevent recovery for any unjustified claims. In
-thisarea Texas' requirement is in accord.
NEuRosis CASES iNTEXAS
Texas was an early leader in extending compensation for mental disability
resulting from physical injury or trauma. Under the Texas statute neurosis
is considered to be among the injuries causing "damage to the physical struc-

ture of the body."' 48 7 On the other hand, when the mental disorder has no
connection with either a physical injury or a fortuitous event arising out of
4s8
the course of employment, it is not compensable.
484. Id. at 109.
485. Id. at 111-12.

486. Id.at 113.
487. TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 20 (Supp. 1974). For an interpretation
of the statute, see Hood v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co., 146 Tex. 522, 206 S.W.2d 345 (1948).
488. See Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Sup.
1972),
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Hood v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co. 489 firmly established the principle
that neurosis resulting from physical injury is compensable. The supreme
court considered the unfeigned incapacity of the claimant-his pain and the
shifting zones of anesthesia in his foot-which a physician testified was not
an organic nerve disorder but of mental origin, and found that the neurosis
was a direct result of the injury to the foot. This type of disability, traceable
to an original physical injury, was found to have been clearly intended by
490
the legislature to be covered by the statute.
,In a subsequent case the supreme court extended the range of situations
in which compensation is to be allowed to include those where the disabling
neurosis does not result from physical injury but is produced by an untoward
event occurring in the course of employment. 491 Bailey v. American General
Insurance Co. 492 definitively construed the statutory term "physical structure
of the body" to include mental disorders or psychosomatic injuries arising independently of any prior physical injury. The plaintiff in this case witnessed
a fellow workman fall to his death eight stories below. The traumatic effect
of the accident resulted in disabling neurosis, or anxiety reaction, which prevented claimant from continuing employment as an ironworker. Bailey suffered symptoms of nervousness, fear of impending disaster, irritability, recurring nightmares, and paralysis when attempting to work at a height. This
nervous condition was shown to be functional damage developing from his
"traumatic experience" of witnessing the fall. The court relied on the testimony that this condition is "just as real and disabling" as damage to any other
part of the body, and decided the statutory term referred to 'the entire body,
or whole system of neural and mechanical processes. 493 A fortiori, claimant
necessarily suffered harm to his body and was entitled to compensation.
Since Bailey the principle of recovery in psychoneurotic cases has solidified
into the requirement which similarly governs heart attack cases: 'the injury
must have been precipitated or contributed to by an untoward event that is
traceable to a definite time and place arising out of the employment. 49 4 The
489. 146 Tex. 522, 209 S.W.2d 345 (1948).
490. Id. at 527, 209 S.W.2d at 348; accord, Colonial Penn Franklin Ins. Co. v. Mayfield, 508 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (claimant developed nervous aberration after sustaining injury to penis); Clayton v. Employers Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ) (claimant suffered chronic anxiety reaction as a result of injury to eye); Miller Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Ochoa, 432 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(claimant developed conversion reaction to fall from wing of airplane).
491. Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
492. Id.
493. Id. at -, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
494. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.
Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477
S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Sup. 1972); Insurance Co. Qf Nqrth America v, Kten, 440 S.W.20 52
(Tex.Sup. 1969),
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unexpected and undesigned event, when connected with work activity, is considered a risk of employment. 49 5 Under this principle a risk of employment
that warrants compensation is an armed robbery of a store, which event
causes the clerk on duty to be "scared to death" and results in her extreme
49 6
psychoneurotic reaction.
This rationale requiring an untoward event as the producing cause of the
mental disability excludes, however, the situation where a gradual buildup
of emotional pressures precipitates a nervous collapse or mental breakdown.
From a practical viewpoint, this limitation in graduated neurosis cases has
well-reasoned application. Reminiscent of the Olson heart attack case, 497 the
cumulative effect of the mental stimuli producing a mental disability is not
deemed accidental, that is, it is not considered a risk of employment upon
which to establish causal connection.
MEDICAL CAUSATION IN HEART AND NEUROSIS CASES

Probative evidence of causal connection between an injury and the employee's work activity lies predominantly in medical testimony. In a claim
for compensation for such idiopathic injuries as heart attacks and neurasthenia, it is crucial that expert testimony establish a reasonable probability that
the employee's exertion or stress, or the untoward event, was a producing
498
or contributing cause of the disability.
Reasonable medical probability is usually sufficient to establish causal relation. 499 As is usual in heart cases, the court generally relies on evidence
and opinion advanced by the medical experts, and then applies the legal definition of causation to the facts. Since what constitutes a producing cause
495. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1958,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
496. Travelers Ins.- Co. v. Garcia, 417 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (Psychiatrist testified that claimant's neurotic condition, characterized
by nervousness, depression, nightmares, and paranoia, was with reasonable medical certainty precipitated by the holdup).
497. Olson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 477 S.W.2d 859, 860, 862 (Tex. Sup.
1972) (Steakley and Reavley, JJ., dissenting).
498. Recovery denied for lack of probative evidence of causal connection: Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 49 P.2d 391, 393 (Ariz. 1935); Brown v. Industrial
Comm'n, 513 P.2d 1369, 1370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Messex v. Georgia-Pacific Corp..
293 So. 2d 615, 617 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Schwehn v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 520
P.2d 467, 470 (Ore. Ct. App. 1974); Webb v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 501 S.W.2d 350.

352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Whitaker v. General Ins. Co.
of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
O'Dell v. Home Indem. Co., 449 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1969, writ

ref'd n.r.e.); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 448 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dotson v. Royal Indem. Co., 427 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Monks v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co..
425 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

499. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Scruggs, 413 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
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is a legal question, conflicting medical opinion existing within the profession
must give way to the inescapable legal conclusion based on the totality of
the facts. 50 0 As one court has stated, the law endeavors to reach an "inference of reasonable medical certainty" from an event or sequence of events;
while a doctor thinks in terms only of a precise medical cause for a particular
condition, the law recognizes other causes toward a particular injurious result. 1°1 The evidence must be sufficient to raise the issue of whether or not
the injury occurred while the claimant was engaged in certain activity within
the course of his employment which triggered events that were the producing
50 2
cause of his ultimate disability.
Evidence of work effort closely followed by well recognized symptoms of
injury points with force to a reasonably probable relation between 'the two
occurences.5,0 For instance, the presumption is raised by the fact that the employee was found unconscious and slumped over construction plans at his
desk, that emotional stress was the producing cause of his fatal coronary occlusion. 50 4 A lapse of time, however, between the work effort and the disability does not necessarily preclude causal connection. 0 5 Ordinarily the
probability of causation is established by means of a hypothetical question,
directed to the medical expert, concerning his opinion as to whether the medical facts would support the presumption that the particular work activity or
event was capable of precipitating the disability. 5 0 In his response the doc507
tor is not allowed to predicate his opinion on assumed facts in the record.
If the record offers no support for the basis of the medical opinion, then it
cannot be said to constitute probative evidence. 508
In compensation claims based on traumatic neurosis, substantiation by
competent expert opinion is even more necessary because of the subjective
nature of the claim. Any lay testimony is "highly suspect" and must be cor500. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 178 A.2d 161, 174 ('N.J. 1962).
501. Murray v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 P.2d 627, 633 (Ariz. 1960).
502. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Scruggs, 413 S.W.2d 416, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
503. Cossident v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 N.E.2d 569, 572 (Ill. 1974).
504. Alexander v. Campbell Constr. Co., 288 So. 2d 4, 5 (Miss. 1974).
505. Dwyer v. Ford Motor Co., 178 A.2d 161, 165 (N.J. 1962).
506. Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169, 175 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 448 S.W.2d
541, 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
507. Alexander v. Campbell Constr. Co., 288 So. 2d 4, 7 (Miss. 1974); Whitaker
v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
508. Whitaker v. General Ins. Co. of America, 461 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Doctor based his opinion on assumed fact that deceased was overexcited about going back to work after period of inactivity while recuperating from heart attack; that he was anxious to please his employer and exerted himself
wiping windshields and working on cars at service station.
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